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11 
II 
I Gary J. Xanthos hereby petitions the Court for a rehearing of its decision filed 
May 1, 1984 in the above-captioned matter, on the following grounds. 
I. 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION THAT THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S 
ACTION WAS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
NOT REVERSE THAT FINDING AND SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN FINDINGS. 
B. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS MAY 1, 1984 DECISION ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
The trial court's decision had two basic components. The first component was to 
conduct a de novo review of the application for a variance. Based on that review, the 
trial court concluded that a variance should have been granted. The Supreme Court, in 
its May 1, 1984 Decision, held that the "plenary action for relief" of U.C.A. §10-9-15 was 
not intended to permit the trial court to make a de novo decision concerning a variance. 
The second component of the trial court's decision involved a finding that the 
Decision of the Board of Adjustment was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Finding 
of Fact No. 22 and Conclusion of Law No. 1 (R. 86 and 87). The findings of fact of the 
trial court should be upheld if there is evidence in the record to support them. 
The accepted standard of review is that the Supreme Court will sustain a decision 
by a trial court if the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. ~ 
v. Cranney, 607 P.2d 295 (Utah 1980); Leon Glazier &: Sons, Inc. v. Larsen, 26 Utah 2d 
429, 491 P.2d 226 (1971); Gibbons&: Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah 172, 256 P.2d 706 
(1953); and Dansak v. Deluke, 12 Utah 2d 302, 366 P.2d 67 (1961). Furthermore, the 
evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Strand v. / 
Cranney, supra; Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163 
(1951); Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958); and Dansak v. Deluke, supra. 
There was in fact ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision. It ' 
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was not based solely on the fact that the perceived economic impact on Xanthos should 
override zoning considerations. 
In this case, there are special circumstances which are unique. First of all, the 
City had approved the configuration for the duplexes and had issued certificates of 
occupancy (April 23, 1978) more than three years prior to the issuance of its December 
1978 order. Second, the physical ·changes and lot layout were barely affected by the 
construction of the new duplexes. 
This Court's Decision of May 1, 1984 states, "Further, the record is replete with 
indications that the City was not made aware at any time during the application and 
approval process that the structure on the lot, prior to building the duplexes, was a 
dwelling." This conclusion is contrary to the record and the evidence. First, the 
application had the plat plan attached to it. Second, anyone looking at the entire 
application, including the attached plat plan, would have seen that a structure was 
there. 
The May 1, 1984 Decision further states, "Also, testimony indicated that, during 
inspections after building commenced, City inspectors had no reason to believe that the 
structure on the property was a dwelling." There is in fact no admissible evidence in 
support of that proposition. The testimony from Mark. Peguillian cites hearsay which was 
without a foundation. Mr. Peguillian testified, "He told me that the building that was 
over in the corner, which looked like an old building was going to be torn down. I never · 
asked him anymore about it. I said okay. Fine." There was an objection made to that · 
hearsay testimony (R. 387) to which counsel for Salt Lake City responded, "Your Honor, 
we'll off er what we're going to pro ff er under the res jestae (sic) exception to the hearsay 
rule, and offer it not for the truth of the matter, but for the fact that it was said and 
that his action was based and relies on that statement." [Emphasis added) (R. 388) 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court relied on that out of court statement to say that the 
city inspectors had no reason to believe that the structure on the property was a 
dwelling. 
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The undisputed evidence and the trial court's findings contradict the findings of 
the Supreme Court. The only evidence which comes close to supporting ~hem is the 
ambiguous hearsay statement attributed to a City inspector who did not testify. And 
that statement did not say that it wasn't a dwelling; that statement was that he thought 
it was going to be torn down. Not even the hearsay statement explained who supposedly 
told the City inspector that it was going to be torn downe 
Further, the undisputed facts in the case do not support the Supreme Court's 
factual conclusion that the premises in question were not occupied during the time of 
construction. The City inspector indicated that, when he was there on May 1, 1975, the 
duplexes were 9096 complete (R. 384 and R. 386). The construction was commenced the 
prior year, in 1974. The testimony of Neysa Jenkins indicated that the premises were 
remodeled in 1974, that a woman, Wanda Johnson, lived there for almost a year, and that 
Gary Xanthos moved in after Wanda Johnson (R. 364). Gary Xanthos moved out in July 
of 19759 Gary Xanthos indicated that he lived there from March or April, 1975 to July of 
1975 (R. 129). 
The certificates of occupancy are dated April 23, . 1975. One would therefore 
presume that the duplexes had been completely inspected at that time or the City would 
not have issued the certificates of occupancy. It would also indicate that the City 'i 
inspector's testimony, at least as to the dates, was incorrect. Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court has obviously drawn the wrong conclusion that the premises were vacant during a 
good deal of the time that construction was going on. The inspector's own testimony w~ ' 
that, on May 1, 1975, the premises were at least 9096 completed. It is admittedly hard to 
reconcile this testimony with the fact that the certificates of occupancy before the 
buildings were complete. But since construction had begun in 197 4, and since the ' 
premises were occupied all during that period of time, through and including July of 
1975, without any question or dispute, it would appear that the court's conclusion that 
the premises were basically empty, and that the City therefore couldn't know that there ' 
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was a dwelling, is contrary to the evidence. Rather, the record supports the trial court's 
finding that there were at least five inspections made. (Finding No. 17, R. 86). 
The Supreme Court's determination that the structure was never listed as a 
residence with the City is also contrary to the evidence. There are numerous water bills, 
electrical bills and tax notices during the period of time where the only residence on the 
property was the one in question. 
There is no question that the land upon which the duplexes were constructed 
contained no other dwelling. They were built on vacant land. The City has an ordinance 
that requires certain notification if the dwelling is being demolished for the construction 
of a new dwelling. City Ordinance §5-8-2(e). At best, the application is ambiguous. To 
think that someone was planning to be able to fool the City, when the City was going to 
be making regular inspections of the property, and that one could hide a building and the 
fact that people were living in it, is pure speculation. The trial court correctly found 
that there was rio believable evidence of proof or intent to defraud or mislead the City. 
(Finding No. 19 R. 86). 
It should also be ·noted that the City was unable to find the actual building 
documents. Mr~ Hafey said it would not find them (R. 254). Because the City could not 
find the actual plans and specifications which would have been presented, we do not know 
whether the actual plans had further information on it concerning this other dwelling. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Supreme Court failed to follow the basic 
doctrine of upholding the findings of the trier of fact. This record is replete with 
evidence to support the trial court's findings. The Supreme Court has made its own 
findings of fact, which respondent respectfully submits are contrary to the evidence in 
the case. 
It is undisputed that there was an issue of law of first impression with regard to 
the scope of review granted to the trial court. The Supreme Court decided that issue 
adverse to the respondent. However, the Supreme Court went on to make its own 
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findings of fact which conflict with the record, rather than following the well established 
• rule of law that findings of fact of the trial court be sustained unless there is a no 
substantial evidence to support them. 
II. 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT TO APPLY THE STANDARD SET FORTH BY THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS 
MAY I, 1984 DECISION. 
If the Supreme Court is concerned that the trial court, because it indicated it was 
viewing the case de novo, did not apply the appropriate standard in its review and in its 
findings that the Board of Adjustment's action was arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable, the case should be remanded to the trial court, which did heard all the 
evidence, to enter findi~gs in accordance with the rule of law set forth in the May I, 
19 8 4 decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed because it determined that the Board 
of Adjustment's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, and there is 
substantial evidence to support that decision, or in the alternative, the case should be 
remanded for the trial court to be given an opportunity to make that decision • 
. ~ ~ 
DATED this ..2J... day of May, 1984. / / 
~~ .J / 
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